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Abstract 
This paper investigates the long-term impact of price-level targeting on social welfare 
in an overlapping generations model in which the young save for old age by investing 
in productive capital and indexed and nominal government bonds. A key feature of 
the model is that the extent of bond indexation is determined endogenously in 
response to monetary policy as part of an optimal commitment Ramsey policy.  Due 
to the absence of base-level drift under price-level targeting, long-term inflation risk 
is reduced by an order of magnitude compared to inflation targeting. Consequently, 
real bond returns are stabilised somewhat, and consumption volatility for old 
generations is reduced by around 15 per cent. The baseline welfare gain from price-
level targeting is equivalent to a permanent increase in aggregate consumption of only 
0.01 per cent, but this estimate is strongly sensitive on the upside.  
 
Keywords: inflation targeting, price-level targeting, optimal indexation, government 
bonds. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper investigates the long-term impact of price-level targeting on social welfare. 
The motivation for studying this issue can be traced back to a result that is well-
known to monetary economists, namely, that inflation targeting (IT) implies ‘base 
drift’ in the price level, whereas price-level targeting (PLT) introduces trend-
stationarity. Hence, whilst inflation risk increases with the forecast horizon under IT, 
it is bounded under PLT. A number of papers have investigated the consequences of 
this result for inflation uncertainty at a long horizon, concluding that uncertainty 
would be reduced by an order of magnitude under PLT (Dittmar, Gavin and Kydland, 
1999; Bordo, Dittmar and Gavin, 2007; Gavin, Keen and Pakko, 2009). However, no 
papers have yet investigated, within a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) 
model, the social welfare impact of PLT through the long-term inflation risk channel.2 
Crucially, as Gavin, Keen and Pakko (2009) point out, standard New Keynesian 
models are not suitable for this purpose, because only short-term inflation fluctuations 
lead to welfare losses for the representative agent (see Woodford, 2001). 
 
This paper presents a DSGE model in which long-term inflation risk matters for social 
welfare, and uses it to estimate the long-term welfare impact of PLT. Making such a 
calculation is of particular importance in light of the fact that the Bank of Canada is 
currently conducting a review of PLT in anticipation of its next policy agreement with 
the Government in 2011.3 Indeed, as emphasised by Ambler (2009), evidence on the 
long-term impact of PLT on social welfare is necessary so that a full cost-benefit 
analysis of PLT can be undertaken. For this reason, the Bank of Canada has identified 
this topic as a key area in which further research is needed (see Bank of Canada, 
2009). Moreover, other central banks and policy institutions have begun to investigate 
PLT for themselves – a partial list includes the Bank of Finland (Mayes, 2008), the 
Bundesbank (Bundesbank, 2010), the ECB (Gaspar, Smets and Vestin, 2007), the 
OECD (Cournède and Moccero, 2009) and US Federal Reserve banks (e.g. Kahn, 
2009) –, making the long-term impact of PLT of potential policy importance more 
widely.4  
 
The model put forth in this paper is an overlapping generations (OLG) model of life-
cycle saving in which the young save for old age using productive capital and indexed 
and nominal government bonds whose payoffs are vulnerable to inflation risk. The 
motivation for studying the welfare impact of PLT in a model with long-term bonds 
that offer imperfect insurance against inflation is set out clearly by Carlstrom and 
Fuerst (2002): 
                                                 
2 That is, to the author’s knowledge. 
3 The review was announced in Bank of Canada (2006). 
4 There is a large literature on the impact of PLT at a short horizon; see the excellent surveys by 
Ambler (2009) and Cournède and Moccero (2009). 
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“[T]he base-drift problem with IT leads to a great deal of uncertainty 
about what the price level 5, 10, or 30 years in the future will be. The 
central bank may miss its inflation target by a very small percentage in 
each year, but if these misses are not offset, they will accumulate and 
become quite large after 30 years. Therefore, a price-level target will 
reduce the uncertainty associated with buying and selling long-term fixed 
bonds.” 
 
A key feature of the model is that indexation of government bonds is determined 
endogenously in response to monetary policy as part of an optimal commitment 
Ramsey policy. This feature of the model is important because social welfare 
comparisons across monetary policy regimes that are vulnerable to the Lucas critique 
can give seriously misleading results (Ambler, 2009). This point has been clearly 
demonstrated for IT versus PLT in the context of wage indexation. Indeed, optimal 
wage indexation is substantially lower under PLT than IT (Minford, Nowell and 
Webb, 2003; Amano, Ambler and Ireland, 2007), and failure to account for this 
difference can give highly misleading welfare results that are of little practical use to 
policymakers (Minford and Peel, 2003). A second critical feature of the model is that 
monetary policy is implemented via money supply rules that capture the long-term 
impact of base-level drift under IT and its absence under PLT. This is done by 
building up the long-term money supply rules in the model from a yearly horizon.   
 
Each generation in the model lives for two periods – youth and old age – that last 30 
years each; hence the young can be thought of as saving over a 30-year horizon from 
‘average youth’ until ‘average old age’ before consuming the lifetime savings they 
have accumulated. Young generations can save for old age by holding money 
balances, productive capital and indexed and nominal government bonds, and there is 
aggregate uncertainty due to real and nominal disturbances. The government, the 
monopoly supplier of bonds in the economy, sets the supplies of indexed and nominal 
bonds so as to maximise social welfare, subject to the monetary policy regime in 
place and consumers’ first-order conditions for optimal saving. Thus the government 
solves an optimal commitment Ramsey problem whose solution determines the 
economy’s equilibrium and, ultimately, the level of social welfare under IT and PLT.  
   
The main findings from the model are as follows. Firstly, due to the presence of base-
level drift under IT and its absence under PLT, inflation volatility is reduced by an 
order of magnitude under PLT. Secondly, as a result of the reduction in inflation 
volatility under PLT, real returns on indexed and nominal bonds are substantially less 
volatile, so that consumption volatility across old generations is reduced by around 15 
per cent. Thirdly, because consumption volatility is reduced under PLT, social welfare 
is increased relative to IT. The estimated welfare gain under the baseline calibration is 
small at 0.01 per cent of aggregate consumption, but this estimate is highly sensitive 
on the upside. Countries that have little (or no) indexation, high nominal volatility, 
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relatively high risk aversion, and in which the public sector plays a dominant role in 
providing retirement income, could gain more substantially from price-level targeting. 
The main policy implication arising from these results is that the long-term welfare 
gain from PLT through the inflation risk channel is likely to be relatively small, but 
not sufficiently so that it can safely be ignored in a cost-benefit analysis of PLT.            
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets out the model, including the monetary 
policy rules under IT and PLT; Section 3 discusses model calibration; Section 4 
describes how the model was solved; Section 5 presents simulation results; and 
Section 6 tests robustness. Finally, Section 7 concludes and discusses policy 
implications.  
 
2. The Model  
      
The model is an OLG model of life-cycle saving in which consumers hold money, 
capital, and indexed and nominal government bonds. Consumers have homogenous 
preferences and live for two periods of 30 years: in the first they are ‘young’ and 
receive an exogenous endowment income; and in the second they are ‘old’ and 
consume the proceeds from their savings in youth, including output produced using 
capital. Population growth is set equal to zero for simplicity5 and, without loss of 
generality, each generation is assumed to have a constant size of one.6  
 
Although ‘fiat money’ is a popular way of justifying money holdings in OLG models 
(e.g. McCandless and Wallace, 1991), this approach is not theoretically convincing 
because money must offer the same return as non-monetary assets to have value, 
implying deflation if other assets offer real returns. Money is instead introduced by a 
cash-in-advance constraint, an approach taken by a number of recent contributions 
that investigate optimal monetary policy in OLG economies (e.g. Michel and 
Wigniolle, 2005; Gahvari, 2007). Monetary policy takes the form of IT and PLT 
money supply rules that are implemented by the government.  
 
The government also carries out fiscal policy by taxing young consumers in order to 
meet a long run government spending target7 and issuing government bonds. The total 
bond supply is set to ensure optimal consumption smoothing (in expected terms) for 
each generation, along the lines of the standard OLG model where government bonds 
are ‘net wealth’ (see Barro, 1974; Minford and Peel, 2002). The mix between indexed 
                                                 
5 Constant population growth would introduce an additional parameter (the population growth rate) but 
would not change model dynamics or, therefore, the social welfare results. 
6 There is no loss of generality because the focus throughout is on per-capita values. All model 
equations would be left unchanged if generations had a constant size greater than one and were 
populated by homogenous consumers.  The only difference is that per-capita values would need to be 
multiplied by the constant generation size in order to get economy-wide aggregates.  
7 This spending is used up in projects that have no direct effect on consumption or utility. 
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and nominal bonds, or the ‘indexation share’, is chosen to maximise social welfare, 
subject to consumers’ first-order conditions, monetary policy, and the long run 
government spending target. Since indexed and nominal bonds are priced to rule out 
arbitrage by consumers’ first-order conditions, all indexation shares in the range [0,1] 
are feasible equilibria. In effect, the government’s indexation problem is to select the 
equilibrium from this feasible set that maximises social welfare under IT and PLT.  
 
The model is solved using a second-order approximation in Dynare++ (Julliard, 
2001). This point is crucial since a linear approximation would ignore asset risk-
premia. More generally, it is well-known that linear approximation can lead to an 
inaccurate social welfare ranking of alternative policies because it ignores the impact 
of uncertainty on the stochastic means of endogenous variables in the model (Kim and 
Kim, 2003; Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2004).  
 
2.1 The consumer problem 
 
Consumers live for two periods of 30 years and have constant relative risk aversion 
(CRRA) preferences: 
          )()( ,1,1,, OtOttYtYtt cuEcuu +++=      (1) 
 
where )1/()( 1,,, δ
δ −≡ −YtYtYt ccu  is utility in youth and )1/()(
1
,1,1,1 δ
δ −≡ −+++ OtOtOt ccu  is 
utility in old age. Consumption in period t when young is denoted by Ytc , , and Otc ,1+  
is consumption in period 1+t  when old.8  
 
The budget constraint faced by the young can be expressed in real terms as follows: 
 
)1(,,,
j
t
d
t
dn
t
di
tYt kmbbc τϖ −=++++           (2) 
 
where ϖ  is a young consumer’s constant real endowment income; t
di
t
di
t PBb /
,, ≡  is 
real demand for indexed bonds; t
dn
t
dn
t PBb /
,, ≡   is real demand for nominal bonds; 
and t
d
t
d
t PMm /≡  is demand for real money balances. Note that uppercase values are 
nominal and tP  is the aggregate price level. Capital in real terms is given by tk , and 
jτ  for ),( PLTITj∈  is the constant rate of income tax. 
 
                                                 
8 Consumers do not discount consumption in old age, as is often assumed in models with overlapping 
generations. Examples from the literature that use this assumption include Champ and Freeman (1990) 
and Brazier, Harrison, King and Yates (2006).    
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Following Artus (1995), consumers’ demand for money arises from a cash-in-advance 
(CIA) constraint which states that real monetary savings are a fraction 10 << θ  of 
consumption when young: 9 
 
                                                         Yt
d
t cm ,×≥ θ                    (3) 
 
As shown in Appendix A, the CIA constraint will bind with strict equality if the 
monetary return on nominal bonds exceeds one. Intuitively, since money is a perfect 
store of nominal value, an optimising consumer will not hold monetary savings in 
excess of the proportion θ  required by the CIA constraint if nominal bonds pay a 
higher return. The CIA constraint is taken to be strictly binding, i.e. Yt
d
t cm ,θ= .
10  
 
 As in Lungu and Minford (2006), capital is used to produce output (which is 
consumed in old age) via a production function with diminishing returns. The 
depreciation rate on capital is 100 per cent, so capital lasts for only one period.11 
Given that the amount of output produced using capital depends on the stochastic 
level of productivity, capital is a claim to an uncertain amount of real output in old 
age.  
 
Output in old age is given by the following production function: 
            αttOt kAy 1,1 ++ =   10 <<α   (4) 
where α  is the elasticity of output with respect to capital. 
Productivity tA  follows an AR(1) process in logs: 
                                          ttmeant eAAA ++−= −1lnln)1(ln ρρ        10 << ρ          (5) 
where the productivity innovation te  is an IID-Normal random variable with mean 
zero and variance 2eσ . 
 
Consumption in old age consists of output produced using capital and savings income 
from holding money and bonds. Real consumption by the old is therefore given by 
 
d
t
m
t
d
t
n
t
i
ttt
d
t
m
t
dn
t
n
t
di
t
i
tttOt
mrbraarkA
mrbrbrkAc
1111
1
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))1((         ++++
+++++
+−++=
+++=
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                        (6) 
                                                 
9 Cited by Crettez, Michel and Wigniolle (1999). This constraint is interpreted as a ‘cash-in-advance’ 
specification in the OLG literature.   
10 Note that the nominal (or money) return on nominal bonds was greater than one in all simulations. 
11 Given that each period lasts 30 years, the assumption of full depreciation is empirically plausible. 
See Nadiri and Prucha (1996) and studies cited therein.  
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where dt
di
t bba /
,≡  is the share of indexed bonds in consumers’ bond portfolios; 
dn
t
di
t
d
t bbb
,, +≡  is total demand for government bonds in real terms; )1/(1 11 ++ +≡ t
m
tr π  
is the gross real return on money balances held from youth to old age; and 
)1/( 1 −≡ −ttt PPπ  is the rate of inflation in period t. The real returns on indexed bonds 
and nominal bonds, itr 1+  and 
n
tr 1+  respectively, are explained in detail below. 
. 
Indexed bonds pay an ex ante riskless gross real return tr  that is endogenously 
determined.12 However, due to the presence of ‘indexation bias’ and lagged 
indexation, the ex post real return on an indexed bond will differ from this riskless 
return. In particular, the ex post real return on an indexed bond held from period t  to 
period 1+t  is given by 
 
                          





+
+
+
×= +
+
+
+ 1
1
1
1 )1(
)1(
t
t
ind
t
t
i
t vrr π
π
                           (7) 
 
where indtπ   is the biased rate of inflation to which indexed bonds are linked, tπ  is the 
true rate of inflation, and tv  is a Gaussian ‘white noise’ innovation whose variance 
2
vσ  is based on the indexation lag length.  
 
The first term in square brackets reflects indexation bias: its value will deviate from 
one if ‘true’ and ‘biased’ inflation are not equal. Indexation is biased because the 
price index used for indexation differs from the true one that defines consumers’ 
standard of living. In the UK case, for example, index-linked gilts are indexed to the 
Retail Prices Index (RPI), whereas the Retail Prices Index excluding mortgage interest 
payments (RPIX) may better reflect the inflation rate faced by the majority of 
pensioners (i.e. ‘old generations’) who do not make mortgage repayments (Leceister, 
O’Dea and Oldfield, 2008). The extent of indexation bias depends on the correlation 
between true and biased inflation, and on the similarity of the inflation variances.    
 
The second term in square brackets captures the impact of lagged indexation on the ex 
post real return received on indexed bonds. Indexation is lagged in practice due to 
data publication and collection lags, and the indexation lag on government bonds 
varies across countries. For example, the large majority of outstanding index-linked 
gilts in the UK are indexed to the RPI with an 8-month lag (DMO, 2010), whereas 
indexed bonds in the US and Canada are linked to the Consumer Prices Index (CPI) 
with a 3-month lag. The indexation lag is modelled by a white noise innovation since 
this is a simple way to capture volatility arising from lagged indexation when the lag 
                                                 
12 The return tr  ensures that the market for indexed bonds clears. 
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length is small relative to the holding period.13 The innovation tv  is exogenous and 
invariant to monetary policy, reflecting the assumption that the length of indexation 
lag is not affected by a shift in monetary policy regime.  
 
Nominal bonds pay a riskless nominal return tR . The ex post real return on nominal 
bonds is certain but for inflation risk and is given by 
 
                                             mtttt
n
t rRRr 111 )1/( +++ ×=+= π                            (8) 
 
where the nominal return tR  is endogenously determined.
14  
 
Finally, the initial old are endowed with 0m  units of real money balances, an initial 
stock of government debt ni bbb 000 += , and capital 0k ; their corresponding level of 
consumption is Oc ,1 . In model simulations, these initial values are set equal to the 
deterministic steady-state values. Trivially, the utility of the initial old is given by 
             
                                                    
δ
δ
−
=
−
1
1
,1
,1
O
O
c
u                                      (9) 
 
2.2 Consumers’ first-order conditions 
 
Consider the following Lagrangian: 
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τϖλ
δ    (10) 
where Yt ,λ ( Ot ,1+λ ) is the Lagrange multiplier on young (old) consumers’ budget 
constraints, and tµ  is the Lagrange multiplier on the CIA constraint.  
First-order conditions are as follows: 
                                      tYtYtYt cc θµλ
δ +=− ,,, :                (11) 
              δλ −+++ = OtOtOt cc ,1,1,1 :                (12) 
            ( )itOttYtdit rEb 1,1,, : ++= λλ                (13)                                                  
( )ntOttYtdnt rEb 1,1,, : ++= λλ                          (14)  
                                                 
13 Modelling the lag explicitly by indexing to past inflation is not an option given that each period lasts 
30 years. 
14 In particular, tR  ensures that the market for nominal bonds clears. 
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                                                ( ) tmtOttYtdt rEm µλλ += ++ 1,1,:                          (15)                                                    
( )11,1,: −++= ααλλ ttOttYtt kAEk                                     (16) 
 
Substituting for the Lagrange multipliers on the budget constraints when young and 
old gives the following consumption Euler equations for indexed bonds, nominal 
bonds, and capital respectively: 
                          t
i
tOttYt rcEc θµ
δδ += +
−
+
− )( 1,1,                                           (17) 
                                                  t
n
tOttYt rcEc θµ
δδ += +
−
+
− )( 1,1,               (18) 
      t
k
tOttYt rcEc θµ
δδ += +
−
+
− )( 1,1,               (19) 
  
where 111
−
++ ≡
αα tt
k
t kAr  is the real return on capital.  
 
The Lagrange multiplier on the cash-in-advance constraint is given by 
 
              ( ) ( ) ( ))()()( 11,111,111,1 mtktOttmtntOttmtitOttt rrcErrcErrcE ++−+++−+++−+ −=−=−= δδδµ         (20) 
 
where the multiple equalities follow from the absence of arbitrage opportunities 
across assets due to bond returns being endogenously determined. Intuitively, 
Equation (20) states that, absent uncertainty, a sufficient condition for the CIA 
constraint to be strictly binding (i.e. 0>tµ  t∀ )
15 is that money be rate of return 
dominated by other assets.     
 
2.3 Government  
 
The government finances spending by taxing young consumers, printing money and 
issuing indexed and nominal government bonds. The government budget constraint in 
real terms is thus given by 
 
                                   snt
n
t
sn
t
si
t
i
t
si
t
s
t
m
t
s
t
j
t brbbrbmrmg
,
1
,,
1
,
1
  
−−− −+−+−+= ϖτ             (21) 
 
where ϖτ j  is revenue from taxing young consumers,   s, itb (
sn
tb
, ) is the real supply of 
indexed (nominal) bonds issued by the government in period t, and stm  is the real 
money supply in circulation in period t.  
 
The government sets the income tax rate on young consumers’ endowment incomes 
jτ  (where ),( PLTITj∈ ) in order to achieve a long run target level of real 
                                                 
15 See Hodrick, Kocherlakota and Lucas (1991).  
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government spending of *)( ggE t =
16 and controls the money supply in the economy 
via money supply rules. The total bond supply snt
si
t
s
t bbb
,, +≡  is set to ensure that the 
marginal utility of consumption in youth is equated with the expected marginal utility 
of consumption in old age, or )( ,1,
δδ −
+
− = OttYt cEc . This policy ensures perfect 
consumption-smoothing in expected terms for each generation, thereby increasing 
lifetime utility as in the standard OLG model in which government bonds are ‘net 
wealth’ (Barro, 1974). 17,18 The supplies of indexed and nominal bonds are 
constrained to be non-negative, so 0, ≥sitb  and 0
, ≥sntb  for all t.  
 
The division of the total bond supply between indexed and nominal bonds, as defined 
by the indexation share ]1 ,0[∈a , is chosen by the government to maximise social 
welfare, taking into account consumers’ first-order conditions, the money supply rule, 
and the necessity of meeting the long run government spending target. The indexation 
problem and the corresponding results are presented in detail in Hatcher (2011). The 
current paper therefore discusses optimal indexation only briefly in Sections 4 and 6. 
 
2.4 Long-term inflation risk, lifetime utility and social welfare 
 
It was noted in the introduction that the workhorse New Keynesian model does not 
allow researchers to explicitly evaluate the impact of long-term inflation risk on social 
welfare. One important advantage of the OLG model presented above is that, by 
contrast, it posits a direct link between long-term (i.e. 30-year) inflation volatility and 
lifetime utility – and hence also to social welfare. As a result, the impact of long-term 
inflation risk on social welfare can be modelled explicitly, laying the foundations for 
an evaluation of the welfare impact of PLT through the long-term inflation risk 
channel.       
 
In order to demonstrate the link between long-term inflation risk and social welfare in 
the OLG model, consider Equation (1), the lifetime utility of a given generation t. 
Taking a second-order Taylor expansion of lifetime utility around expected values 
yields the following expression: 
                               )(var
)(2
1~
,11
,1
Ott
Ott
t ccE
u ++
+ 







−≈ δ
δ
                                 (22) 
 
                                                 
16 That is, the government has risk-neutral preferences over government spending. 
17 The ‘net wealth’ result was first demonstrated formally by Barro, but he argues against government 
bonds being a source of net wealth because introducing a bequest motive into the OLG model 
resurrects the Ricardian equivalence proposition.   
18 In a model without uncertainty, the government can set the total bond supply so that all generations 
enjoy perfect consumption smoothing ex post, thereby maximising lifetime utility for all generations. 
See Minford and Peel (2002) for a simple example. 
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where ),(~ ,1, OttYtttt cEcuuu +−≡ is the difference between lifetime utility tu  and the 
level of lifetime utility when consumption levels are at their time-t expected values. 
 
The impact of long-term inflation risk is captured by the conditional variance of 
consumption in old age (which reduces lifetime utility due to risk aversion). Appendix 
B shows this point explicitly by log-linearising the model around the deterministic 
steady-state to obtain neat expressions for OttcE ,1+  and )(var ,1 Ott c + .  
 
The resulting expression for tu
~  is given by 
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where tχ ,ϕ ,κ ,η  andϑ  are positive coefficients; see Appendix B for the details.  
 
The loss in lifetime utility increases with long-term inflation risk, )(var 1+tt π , since 
this increases the extent of return risk faced by bondholders.19 The loss in utility also 
depends on the extent of indexation bias, volatility arising due to the indexation lag, 
and long-term productivity volatility (since this causes fluctuations in output produced 
for consumption in old age). The covariance between actual and biased inflation 
enters with a positive sign because it denotes the extent to which indexed bonds can 
protect consumers against inflation fluctuations. However, given that indexed bonds 
are imperfect, they can provide only partial insurance.20 As social welfare is measured 
by average lifetime utility across all generations (see Section 2.6), Equation (23) 
implies that long-term inflation risk will reduce social welfare.21   
 
2.5 Monetary Policy 
  
The major difference between IT and PLT is that the former implies base-level drift in 
the price level, whilst the latter prevents base-level drift. To allow for this difference, 
the 30-year (i.e. one period) money supply rules under IT and PLT are built up from a 
yearly horizon. With this approach, equilibrium inflation in the model reflects the 
                                                 
19 An increase in long-term inflation risk also increases (real) return risk from holding money.  
20 If indexed bonds are excluded from the model, the loss in lifetime utility will depend only on 
inflation risk and productivity (since 0=== ηκϕ ), thus highlighting the negative impact of 
inflation risk more clearly.   
21 There are several alternative ways to reach the same conclusion. For instance, the whole model can 
be solved by log-linearisation (in which case risk-premia are ignored) and the resulting consumption 
levels can be substituted into a second-order expansion of the social welfare function, or the 
conditional variance of consumption in Equation (22) can be calculated without log-linearising the 
budget constraint of old agents. These derivations are available from the author on request. 
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presence of base-level drift under IT, and its absence under PLT. Since the derivation 
of 30-year money supply rules from yearly ones is long-winded, the details are 
presented in Appendix C.   
 
Given the long-term horizon embedded in the model, monetary policy does not 
respond directly to output or productivity, and since the government can commit to 
money supply rules, no time-inconsistency or credibility issues arise in relation to 
monetary policy. The money supply rules given below are stated in terms of the 
nominal money supply (which is non-stationary), but the money supply is converted 
back into real terms in order to solve the model in Dynare++.  
 
The IT money supply rule 
 
The nominal money supply rule under IT takes the following form:  
 
       ∑
=
−− ++×=
30
1
,1,,
,
1
, )/ln(  30)/ln(
i
YtYtti
ITs
t
ITs
t ccMM επ                  (24) 
 
where π  is the annual inflation target and the ti,ε s are Gaussian white noise money 
supply innovations in year i of period t, each with variance 2σ .  
 
Notice that under IT the aggregate money supply innovation is simply the sum of the 
30 yearly money supply innovations that accumulate in each period due to base-level 
drift. In the absence of money supply innovations, Equation (24) implies perfect 
stabilisation of inflation at the inflation target.   
 
Money market equilibrium (i.e. st
d
t MM = , where
d
tt
d
t mPM = ) implies that inflation 
under IT is given by22 
       ∑
−
+×=
30
1
,30
i
ti
IT
t εππ                                (25) 
 
Therefore, expected inflation is equal to the 30-year inflation target, and the inflation 
variance is thirty times the yearly money supply innovation variance: 
 
        ππ ×=+ 301
IT
ttE                (26) 
       230)var( σπ =ITt                          (27) 
  
                                                 
22 To arrive at this expression for inflation, take the first difference of the natural log of (nominal) 
money demand and use the approximation 1lnln −−≈ ttt PPπ . Then set money demand equal to 
money supply and solve for inflation. 
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Intuitively, expected inflation is equal to the inflation target because the government 
makes a fully credible commitment to an IT money supply rule. The inflation variance 
is thirty times the yearly innovation variance because of base-level drift: money 
supply innovations cause inflation to deviate from target in each year, and over thirty 
years these innovations accumulate, with each one adding to long-term inflation 
uncertainty.       
 
The PLT money supply rule 
 
The nominal money supply rule under PLT is given by  
 
       )/ln( )/ln()/ln( ,1,1,30,30
*
1
*,
1
,
YtYttttt
PLTs
t
PLTs
t ccPPMM −−−− +−+= εε           (28) 
  
where *tP  is the target price level and t,30ε  is the money supply innovation in year 30 
of period t. 
 
In the absence of money supply innovations, this money supply rule implies perfect 
stabilisation of the price level at target; excepting this, the price level will deviate 
from its target value in each period. The presence of a lagged money supply 
innovation in Equation (28) reflects the response of the PLT money supply rule to the 
price-level deviation in the previous period – a response that is necessary to return the 
price level to its target path.  
 
It assumed that the target log price level under PLT increases at the target rate of 
inflation under IT: 23 
    tpPt )30(ln 0
* π×+=               (29) 
 
where 0p  is the initial target price level.  
 
The money supply rule in Equation (29) can therefore be written as follows:  
 
            )/ln( 30)/ln( ,1,1,30,30
,
1
,
YtYttt
PLTs
t
PLTs
t ccMM −−− +−+×= εεπ               (30) 
 
In contrast to the IT case, the 30-year money supply rule contains only two yearly 
money supply innovations which relate to year 30 in adjacent periods. The reasoning 
is as follows: innovations that occur in years 1-29 are offset in the following year in 
order to bring the price level back to its target path. For instance, a shock in year 29 
                                                 
23 The rate of inflation implied by the target price path is assumed to be equal to the inflation target to 
ensure direct comparability of IT and PLT. With this assumption, IT and PLT are identical in the 
absence of money supply innovations and PLT can be interpreted as ‘average inflation targeting’. 
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will be offset in year 30, the last year of the current period. However, the innovation 
in year 30 of each period cannot be offset until year 1 of the next period. Hence the 
innovations t,30ε  and 1,30 −tε  enter the money supply rule. The first is the innovation in 
year 30 of the current period, and the second is the innovation from year 30 of the 
previous period (which is then offset in year 1 of the current period). 
 
Money market equilibrium implies that inflation under PLT is given by 
 
    1,30,3030 −−+×= tt
PLT
t εεππ                         (31) 
 
Hence expected inflation is state-contingent, and the 30-year inflation variance is two 
times the yearly innovation variance: 
 
     1,301 30 −+ −×= t
PLT
ttE εππ                (32) 
             22)var( σπ =PLTt                                      (33) 
 
Both of these results have been discussed in the PLT literature (e.g. Svensson, 1999; 
Minford, 2004). First, expected inflation varies because past deviations from the 
target price path are subsequently offset, and rational agents take this into account 
when forming their inflation expectations. Second, the 30-year inflation variance is 15 
times lower under PLT since inflation depends on only 2 yearly money supply 
innovations, compared to 30 under IT. The reasoning is simply that yearly deviations 
from the inflation target do not accumulate to increase long-term inflation uncertainty, 
because PLT precludes base-level drift.  
 
 
In order to make the differences between IT and PLT concrete, Panels (a) and (b) of  
Figure 1 report impulse responses of inflation to a period-t money supply innovation. 
As the yearly money supply innovation variance has not yet been calibrated, the 
innovation was normalised to one in the IT case and scaled accordingly in the PLT 
case. The differences between IT and PLT are clear: the initial impact is somewhat 
smaller under PLT because of the lower (30-year) money supply innovation variance; 
and the inflationary shock is reversed in the following period under PLT but is treated 
as a bygone under IT. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 15
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, the biased inflation rate to which indexed bonds are linked is given by an 
exogenous process that has the same functional form as true inflation. In particular, 
the mean is given by the 30-year inflation target, and inflation responds only to 
current innovations under IT but to current and past innovations under PLT. As a 
result, the 30-year variance is also 15 times lower under PLT than IT.  
 
The biased inflation rate used for indexation is given by  
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where ( )2,  ,0~ indindti N σε , and 2indσ  is the yearly innovation variance to biased inflation.  
 
The indti,ε s are serially-uncorrelated but are contemporaneously cross-correlated with 
innovations to true inflation, with the cross-correlation reflecting the extent of 
indexation bias. Both the cross-correlation between innovations and the innovation 
variances (for true and biased inflation) are estimated using UK data. 
  
2.6 Social welfare 
 
The government maximises the unconditional expectation of social welfare, that is, 
the average across all possible histories of shocks (see Damjanovic, Damjanovic and 
Nolan, 2008). The unconditional welfare criterion was first proposed by Taylor 
(1979), and has been used in numerous papers in the monetary policy literature, 
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Fig. 1 – Inflation impulse responses to a money supply innovation 
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including Rotemberg and Woodford (1998), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), and 
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007).24   
 
Given consumers’ lifetime utility function and the utility of the initial old, average 
lifetime utility across T generations is given by  
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Social welfare is defined as the unconditional expectation of this expression, or 
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2.7 Steady state and market-clearing conditions 
 
The model’s deterministic steady state and market-clearing conditions are presented 
in Appendix D, and Appendix E gives a full model listing. 
 
3. Calibration  
 
Model calibration is described in detail in Hatcher (2011). Therefore, the current 
paper provides only a brief discussion. 
 
3.1 Money supply rules and biased inflation 
 
The money supply rules and the stochastic process for biased inflation were calibrated 
using UK inflation since 1997. The Retail Prices Index excluding mortgage interest 
payments (RPIX) was chosen as the measure of ‘true’ inflation and the Retail Prices 
Index (RPI) as the ‘biased’ measure, with the sample period running from 1997Q3 to 
2010Q2.25 The RPIX was chosen as the measure of true inflation because it excludes 
mortgage interest payments, which are not faced by the majority of pensioners in the 
                                                 
24 Examples of OLG models in which monetary policy is evaluated using an unconditional social 
welfare criterion include Brazier, Harrison, King and Yates (2006) and Kryvtsov, Shukayev and 
Ueberfeldt (2007). 
25 The Bank of England was assigned an inflation target soon after ‘Black Wednesday’ in 1992, but 
was not given full operational independence until May 1997. 
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UK (Leicester, O’Dea and Oldfield, 2008). It also includes council tax and housing 
costs, both of which are relatively more important costs for pensioners that are 
excluded from the Consumer Prices Index (CPI). Given that indexed bonds in the UK 
are linked to the Retail Prices Index (RPI), the stochastic process for biased inflation 
was calibrated using the RPI.  
 
The annual inflation target was set equal to 2.5 per cent, which is close to mean RPIX 
inflation over the sample period, and the innovation variances, which are yearly, were 
calibrated by applying the unit root hypothesis to the quarterly variances of RPIX and 
RPI inflation.26 Finally, the covariance between innovations to true inflation and 
biased inflation was calculated using the sample correlation of 0.89. The results are 
summarised in Table 1.  
 
Table 1 – Money supply and biased inflation calibration 
Model 
parameter 
Role in the model Calibrated value 
π×30  Inflation target over 30 
years 
0.75 
)var( ,tiε  Yearly money supply 
 innovation variance 
41044.1 −×  
)var( ,
ind
tiε  Yearly biased inflation  
innovation variance  
41013.2 −×  
),cov( ,,
ind
titi εε  Yearly covariance  
between innovations 
41056.1 −×  
( ))()(89.0 ,, indtiti sdsd εε ××=  
 
3.2 Calibrating stochastic productivity 
 
To calibrate the productivity process, a typical quarterly calibration from the real 
business cycle (RBC) literature was extended over a 30-year horizon.  
 
Consider an AR(1) process for log productivity at a quarterly horizon q: 
 
         qqqmeanqqq eAAA ++−= −1, lnln)1(ln ρρ    10 << qρ                 (37) 
 
where qe  is an IID-Normal productivity innovation with mean zero and variance 
2
qσ .  
 
By substituting repeatedly for lagged productivity terms, productivity over a 30-year 
(i.e. 120 quarters) horizon can be obtained as follows: 
                           ∑
=
−− ++−=
119
0
120
120
,
120 lnln)1(ln
j
jq
j
qqqmeanqqq eAAA ρρρ              (38) 
                                                 
26 Dickey-Fuller tests on the quarterly RPIX and RPI could not reject the null hypothesis of a unit root 
in the price level. 
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Therefore, productivity in any given period t is given by 
 
        ttmeant eAAA ++−= −1lnln)1(ln ρρ                       (39) 
where )1/(ln)1(ln ,
120 ρρ −−≡ meanqqmean AA ,  
120
qρρ ≡  and ∑
=
−≡
119
0j
jq
j
qt ee ρ . 
 
Equation (39) is used as basis for calibrating the stochastic productivity process in the 
model. Following Gavin, Keen and Pakko (2009), the quarterly productivity 
innovation standard deviation is set at 0.005, and the quarterly autocorrelation 
coefficient at 996.0=qρ , consistent with the bulk of the RBC literature. Finally, 
steady-state productivity was set equal to 3/4. The calibration of the productivity 
process is summarised in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 – Calibration of stochastic productivity 
Model 
parameter 
Role in the model Calibrated 
value 
ρ  Persistence in productivity at a  
30-year horizon 
0.618 
eσ  Productivity innovation standard 
deviation (at a 30-year horizon) 
0.04398 
meanA  Steady-state level of productivity  0.75 
 
 
3.3 Calibrating the indexation lag  
  
The random innovation tv  is used to proxy for the impact of an indexation lag on the 
ex post real return on indexed bonds. In order to calibrate its variance, a number of 
points should be considered. First, given the specification of the real return on 
indexed bonds, it should have the same units as the term )1/()1( t
ind
t ππ ++ which it 
appears in brackets alongside. Hence tv  is interpreted as the impact of the indexation 
lag, in percentage points, on the inflation-indexed component of an indexed bond. 
Second, the variance of tv  should reflect the volatility of the inflation rate to which 
indexed bonds are linked, measured over a horizon defined by the length of the 
indexation lag.  
 
Given that the indexation lag on the majority of outstanding index-linked gilts in the 
UK is 8 months, this variance was calibrated using the standard deviation of RPI 
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inflation measured over a three-quarter horizon.27 Based on this standard deviation of 
0.0121 (1.2 per cent), the variance of tv  was set equal to 000146.00121.0
22 ==vσ .  
 
3.4 Model parameter calibration 
 
The calibration of other parameters in the model is given in Table 3. The model was 
calibrated so as to match approximately, at steady-state, the ratio of key variables to 
GDP in UK data.  A key ratio in the model is that of capital to bond holdings. This 
ratio is calibrated so as to match (i) the ratio of investment to government bonds in 
UK data, and (ii) the ratio of private sector to public sector pension spending, with 
capital interpreted as private pensions and government bonds as public sector 
pensions.28 The endowment income of young consumers was chosen so that steady-
state GDP was equal to 2.  
 
Table 3 –Calibration of model parameters 
Model 
parameter 
Role in the model Calibrated value 
θ  Proportion of consumption when young 
held as money balances 
0.10 
δ  Coefficient of relative risk aversion 3 
ϖ  Endowment income of young consumers 1.641 
 *g  Long run government spending target 0.40 
α  Elasticity of output produced for old age 
with respect to capital 
0.375 
 
The deterministic steady-state of the model under this calibration is shown in Table 4. 
Aggregate consumption accounts for 73 per cent of GDP and is split equally between 
consumption by young and old generations.29 Money holdings are approximately 3.7 
per cent of GDP (i.e. 0.073/2), which is similar to the UK share of notes and coins in 
GDP over the past decade (ONS Financial Statistics, 2010), and the government 
spending target of 20 per cent of GDP is similar to the government spending share in 
UK data (ONS Blue Book, 2010). The remaining 7 per cent of GDP is accounted for 
by investment, which is given by the level of capital holdings as there is full 
depreciation. The ratio of investment to GDP is lower than in UK data (around 15 per 
cent), but the ratio of capital holdings to bond holdings (41 per cent) is close to the 
average ratio of investment to government bonds in the UK over the past decade 
                                                 
27 Using 3 quarters (9 months) meant that the same quarterly RPI data could be used in estimation 
throughout the paper. 
28 There are a number of similarities between UK public sector pensions and long-term government 
bonds, including the holding period, the length of the indexation lag (8 months), and the price index 
used for indexation (RPI in both cases). Moreover, as UK public sector pensions are predominantly 
‘defined benefit’, they are in effect long-term nominal contracts; see Whitehouse (2009) for a 
discussion.      
29 The reason for the equal split is that the government sets the total bond supply so that consumption is 
smoothed between youth and old age. 
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(ONS Blue Book, 2010; ONS Financial Statistics, 2010), and is equal to the ratio of 
private pension spending to public pension spending in the UK in 2006 (OECD, 
2009). Finally, steady-state inflation is equal to the 30-year inflation target of 0.75 – 
i.e. a 75 per cent increase in prices over a 30-year horizon.  
 
Table 4 – Key variables at steady-state 
Model variable Steady-state value 
Ytc ,  0.730 
Otc ,  0.730 
)( st
d
t bb =  0.343 
   )( st
d
t mm =  0.073 
tk  0.140 
tπ  0.75 
                                    Note: Steady-state GDP is equal to 2 
 
4. Model solution 
 
The model was solved using second-order approximation in Dynare++ (Julliard, 
2001) for two reasons. First, linearizing the model would remove covariance risk, thus 
eliminating risk-premia in asset returns. Second, when comparing social welfare 
across alternative monetary policy regimes, linear approximation can easily lead to an 
inaccurate ranking of policies because it neglects the impact of second-order terms on 
the stochastic means of endogenous variables in the model. For instance, Kim and 
Kim (2003) present a simple two-agent economy in which linearization leads to the 
spurious conclusion that autarky delivers higher social welfare than full risk sharing. 
In the model at hand, spurious conclusions regarding optimal indexation and social 
welfare could be drawn if linear approximation methods were employed.  
 
The model solution was carried out in two stages. In the first stage, the optimal 
indexation shares under IT and PLT were identified from the feasible range [0,1] 
using a method akin to grid search. Then, in the second stage, the model was solved 
with the optimal indexation shares imposed so as to obtain full simulation results 
under optimal commitment. Each solution of the model was based upon 1000 
simulations of 5000 periods each, with the simulation seed chosen randomly in each 
simulation. 
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5. Results 
 
5.1 Optimal indexation 
 
The optimal indexation results are summarised in Table 5. Only a brief discussion is 
provided here as the results are explained in detail in Hatcher (2011). As noted 
therein, the optimal indexation shares approximately minimise consumption volatility 
across old generations. The reason is that changes in indexation affect consumption 
risk (primarily for old generations) but not the average level of aggregate 
consumption. 
 
   Table 5 – Optimal indexation under IT and PLT 
Monetary 
policy 
Optimal indexation 
share 
 Share at  which )var( ,Otc  
minimised 
IT 76% 77% 
PLT 26% 27% 
 
Optimal indexation is substantially lower under PLT. The intuition is that targeting 
the price level reduces long-term inflation risk by an order of magnitude, hence 
making nominal bonds a better store of value compared to indexed bonds, and 
enabling old generations’ consumption volatility to be reduced by substitution from 
indexed bonds to nominal bonds. Nine-tenths of the reduction in indexation under 
PLT arises because real return volatility falls more sharply on nominal bonds than 
indexed bonds: nominal bonds pay a return that is certain except for inflation risk, 
whilst the return paid on indexed bonds depends, additionally, on risk arising from the 
indexation lag – risk which is not reduced under PLT. The remainder of the reduction 
in indexation is due to the real payoffs from holding money and nominal bonds being 
less closely correlated under PLT than IT (i.e. a reduction in covariance risk) due to 
expected inflation varying over time.30    
 
5.2 Social welfare and consumption volatility 
 
In order to measure the impact of PLT on social welfare in a way that is relevant for 
policy, the consumption equivalent welfare gain was calculated. Formally, the 
consumption equivalent welfare gain λ  is defined as the change in consumption by 
young and old generations, as a fraction of consumption under IT, that is necessary to 
equate social welfare under the two policies, i.e.   
 
PLT
society
IT
society UU =+
−δλ 1)1(                                            (40) 
 
                                                 
30 Recall that expected inflation is constant under the IT regime. 
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where ITsocietyU  is social welfare under IT and 
PLT
societyU  is social welfare under PLT. 
 
If λ  is positive, this indicates that social welfare is higher under PLT than IT, and 
that the gain in welfare is equivalent to an increase in consumption for all young and 
old generations of 100×λ  per cent. On the other hand, if social welfare is higher 
under IT, then λ  will be negative. Note that since aggregate consumption is 73 per 
cent of steady-state GDP, the consumption equivalent welfare gain can be expressed 
in terms of a gain or loss in per cent of GDP by multiplication of λ  by 0.73. 
 
Table 6 reports social welfare under IT and PLT, plus consumption means and 
variances across young and old generations. The latter provide intuition for the social 
welfare results, as is explained in detail below. 
 
Table 6 – Social welfare and consumption 
Simulated value IT PLT 
YtEc ,  0.730 0.730 
OtEc ,  0.731 0.731 
1000)var( , ×Ytc  0.0385 0.0387 
1000)var( , ×Otc  0.3401 0.2946 
λ  (in % terms) 0.010% 
         Notes: Mean consumption levels are rounded to 3 d.p. 
 
Social welfare is increased under PLT. However, the welfare gain is rather small at an 
increase in consumption for young and old generations of 0.010 per cent, or an 
increase in GDP of 0.007 per cent. Based on UK data, this increase in consumption is 
equal to only £10.80 per pensioner, or £3.13 per member of the working population. It 
should be noted, however, that in principle these gains would apply to all current and 
future generations (i.e. the gain would be permanent). Moreover, the level of 
consumption (or GDP) on which these gains are calculated would grow over time.  
 
Mean consumption levels for young and old generations are the same under IT and 
PLT, but there are non-trivial differences in terms of consumption risk. In particular, 
consumption volatility across young generations rises slightly under PLT (an increase 
of 0.5 per cent), but this is more than offset by a substantive reduction in consumption 
volatility across old generations of 13.1 per cent. Consumption volatility across young 
generations increases under PLT because expected inflation is time-varying, and this 
causes successive generations of young consumers to substitute between money and 
non-monetary assets (capital, indexed bonds and nominal bonds) since the expected 
real return on money rises when expected inflation falls, and falls when inflation 
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expectations rise. The increase in consumption volatility is minimal reflecting the fact 
that these portfolio substitution effects are small.31   
 
On the other hand, consumption volatility across old generations falls somewhat 
under PLT due to the reduction in inflation risk by an order of magnitude. The reason 
is that the reduction in inflation risk under PLT dramatically reduces real return 
volatility on indexed and nominal bonds, as Figure 2 clearly illustrates.32 It is striking 
that the proportional reduction in consumption risk under PLT is much smaller than 
the reductions in risk on bond returns (compare the third panel of Figure 2 to the first 
two). This result is driven by the fact that risk arising from holding capital is the main 
source of consumption volatility for old generations – risk which is unaffected by a 
shift from IT to PLT because it is driven by the exogenous level of productivity. 
Consequently, PLT can reduce only a relatively small proportion of overall 
consumption risk via its stabilising impact on bond returns. 
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Fig. 2 – Real bonds returns and consumption in old age 
 
It is also notable that the welfare gain from PLT is far smaller, in percentage terms, 
than the reduction in consumption risk it engenders. As demonstrated formally in the 
next section, this result arises because changes in consumption volatility have only a 
second-order impact on social welfare, whilst mean consumption levels have a first-
order impact.      
 
                                                 
31 Note that the variance of expected inflation under PLT is equal to 2σ . 
32 The histograms in Figure 2 are based on the first 100,000 periods of the simulation in Table 6. 
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5.3 Intuition for the welfare results 
 
As discussed above, the gain in welfare under PLT arises due to a reduction in 
consumption risk. This section provides intuition for this result based upon the social 
welfare function. Social welfare is given by Equation (36), but that expression is 
cumbersome to work with analytically. Hence consider the following equation: 
 
       ( ))()( ,, OtYtsociety cucuEU +=                                            (41) 
 
This expression arises exactly if the utility of the initial old is excluded from social 
welfare (or equivalently if the limit of Equation (36) is taken as the number of 
generations T tends to infinity). The reason is that all generations, except the initial 
old, are ex ante homogenous and hence have the same long run average level of 
utility.  
 
Given that the model is solved using a second-order perturbation method, we can 
work with a second-order Taylor expansion of the above equation around 
unconditional mean consumption levels. Making use of the CRRA specification of 
utility, this expansion results in the following social welfare criterion: 
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where ( ) )1(, δδ +−−= Ytsocietycc EcU YY  ( )( ))1(, δδ +−−= Otsocietycc EcU OO  is the second derivative of 
societyU  with respect to Ytc ,  ( Otc , ). 
 
Therefore, social welfare can be expressed in a mean-variance form in which welfare 
is positively related to mean consumption levels by young and old generations, but 
negatively related to consumption risk. The above expression also makes clear that 
mean consumption levels have a first-order impact on social welfare, whilst 
consumption risk has only a second-order impact. In order to gain intuition for the 
equivalence of mean aggregate consumption levels under IT and PLT (see Table 6), 
consider a first-order Taylor expansion of the first term on the right hand side of 
Equation (42) around the deterministic steady-state.33  
 
                                                 
33 This approximation is employed only to provide intuition. When the model was simulated, the full 
expression for social welfare was evaluated up to second-order. 
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Using this approximation results in the following social welfare criterion:            
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where OtYt EcEc ,, +  is the average level of aggregate consumption. 
 
The goods market-clearing condition αϖ 1,, −+=+++ ttttOtYt kAgkcc  can be used to 
show that OtYt EcEc ,, +  is approximately invariant to a switch in monetary policy from 
IT to PLT (or vice versa). In particular, taking the unconditional expectations operator 
through the market-clearing condition gives ( )tttOtYt kkAEgEcEc −+−=+ −αϖ 1,, * , 
which is approximately independent of the money supply rule, since capital is pure 
real asset whose real return is uncorrelated with inflation. The key to the invariance 
result is that the government must meet its long run government spending target of 
*gEg t = , regardless of whether it targets inflation or the price level.  
    
Thus, using notation employed by Woodford (2001), the expression for social welfare 
in Equation (43) can be written as follows:  
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,, Ot
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+−≈     +    t.i.p.                (44) 
 
where  t.i.p. stands for ‘terms independent of policy’, which in this context should be 
taken to mean ‘terms that are approximately independent of a change in monetary 
policy regime from IT to PLT’ (or vice versa). 
 
That the gain in welfare under PLT arises directly from a reduction in consumption 
risk can be seen clearly from Equation (44). Indeed, PLT leads to an increase in 
welfare because there is a substantial reduction in consumption volatility across old 
generations, but only a small increase in volatility across young generations.  
 
 26
6. Sensitivity analysis 
 
This section analyses the sensitivity of the social welfare gain from PLT to model 
specification and key calibrated parameters and variances. 
 
6.1 Indexation and social welfare 
 
An issue that can be investigated using the model is the impact of indexation being 
optimised. This issue is of interest for two reasons. Firstly, an important finding from 
the PLT literature is that optimal indexation of wages is substantially lower under 
PLT than IT and that this has important implications for social welfare comparisons. 
For example, Amano, Ambler and Ireland (2007) find that assuming wage indexation 
is exogenous understates substantially the potential welfare gain of PLT vis-à-vis IT. 
An even stronger result is found by Minford and Peel (2003) – holding indexation 
fixed under PLT gives the incorrect conclusion that social welfare is higher under IT. 
An interesting question for the current model is whether the change in optimal bond 
indexation under PLT (from 76 per cent to 26 per cent) is important for the welfare 
gain from PLT. This issue is investigated by calculating the welfare gain from PLT 
under the assumption that indexation remains fixed at the optimal level under IT. 
 
Secondly, indexation of government bond portfolios is rather low in developed 
economies, and well below the optimal of 76 per cent implied by the model under IT. 
In fact, amongst developed countries, indexed government bonds are most prevalent 
in the UK at roughly one-quarter of the total government bond portfolio, compared to 
around a 10 per cent share in the US (Campbell, Shiller and Viceira, 2009) and 2 per 
cent in Japan (Kitamura, 2009). It is therefore instructive to compute the welfare gain 
from PLT when the extent of bond indexation in the model is fixed at a low level that 
is comparable to the experiences of developed economies. For this purpose, the 
indexation share was set at 21 per cent, the share of indexed bonds in the UK portfolio 
as of March 2010 (see DMO, 2010).34  
 
The results from these two sensitivity exercises are shown in Table 7. For comparison 
purposes, the consumption equivalent welfare gain from the baseline calibration is 
shown in bold in the middle column.  
 
Table 7 – Indexation and the welfare gain from PLT, λ  
Indexation fixed 
at IT optimal 
(76 per cent) 
Optimal 
indexation 
(Baseline) 
Indexation fixed  
at UK level  
(21 per cent) 
0.008% 0.010% 0.020% 
                                                 
34 Note also that public sector pensions in most developed economies are indexed (Whitehouse, 2009), 
but only once in payment and not during the ‘holding period’.  
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The welfare gain from PLT is underestimated by one-fifth if indexation under PLT is 
held fixed at the optimal level under IT. The reasoning is simply that there is a rise in 
consumption risk across old generations.  On the other hand, if indexation is fixed at 
the current UK level under both IT and PLT, the welfare gain from PLT is doubled 
relative to the baseline case. Intuitively, low indexation works in favour of PLT and 
against IT since optimal indexation is substantially lower under the former. 
Furthermore, as bond indexation is below 20 per cent in other developed economies, 
this estimate can be interpreted as a lower bound estimate of the welfare gain from 
PLT if issuance of indexed government debt remains limited. 
 
6.2 Model parameters 
 
The welfare results are robust to variations in model parameters, with the exception of 
the extent of risk aversion and the correlation between true inflation and biased 
inflation. Therefore, this section focuses on sensitivity with respect to the risk 
aversion coefficient δ  and the indexation bias correlation.35  
 
Risk aversion 
 
The baseline calibration of 3 is close to the mid-range of values considered plausible 
in the literature - in particular, risk aversion coefficients in a range from 1 to 5 seem 
most relevant from an empirical perspective. On this basis, sensitivity is tested when 
the risk aversion coefficient is equal to alternative values of 3/2 and 5.36 Given that 
indexation is endogenously determined, the optimal indexation share varies as risk 
aversion is changed. Table 8 therefore reports both welfare gains and the 
corresponding optimal indexation shares as risk aversion is varied. The baseline 
results are highlighted in bold in the middle column. 
 
Table 8 – Sensitivity to risk aversion 
                                  
Simulated value 
Coefficient of relative risk aversion, δ  
2/3=δ  3=δ  5=δ  
IT optimal  
indexation share 
77% 76% 78% 
PLT optimal 
indexation share 
24% 26% 27% 
λ  0.006% 0.010% 0.014% 
 
   
The extent of risk aversion has relatively little impact on optimal indexation but has a 
substantial impact on the estimated welfare gain from PLT. When risk aversion is 
                                                 
35 The sensitivity results for the other parameters are available from the author on request. 
36 Using US stock return data from 1926-2002, Tödter (2008) estimates 95 per cent confidence interval 
of (1.4, 7.1) for the coefficient of relative risk aversion. 
 28
relatively low, the welfare gain from PLT falls to 0.006 per cent of aggregate 
consumption, whilst with ‘high’ risk aversion it rises to 0.014 per cent – deviations of 
four-tenths from the baseline welfare gain. The reasoning behind the impact of risk 
aversion on the welfare gain is that an increase (decrease) in risk aversion increases 
(reduces) the relative importance of consumption risk for social welfare. Hence, for 
instance, a reduction in old generations’ consumption volatility is valued more heavily 
in social welfare when risk aversion is increased, thus increasing the potential welfare 
gain from PLT.    
 
Indexation bias  
 
In order to investigate the impact of changes in the extent of indexation bias on the 
welfare gain from PLT, the model was simulated for alternative correlations between 
innovations to the money supply (i.e. innovations to true inflation) and innovations to 
biased inflation. In the baseline calibration, this correlation was set at 0.89; as a result, 
true and biased inflation were strongly positively correlated. In this section, sensitivity 
is investigated to with respect to alternative correlations of 0.80 and 0.98, thus 
providing results applicable to countries with more substantial indexation bias than in 
the baseline calibration, and also to those in which indexation bias is more or less 
absent.  The results from these sensitivity tests are presented in Table 9. 
 
Table 9 – Sensitivity to indexation bias 
 
Simulated 
value 
   Inflation correlation, ),( indcorr ππ  
0.80 0.89 0.98 
IT optimal 
share 
71% 
 
76% 85% 
PLT 
optimal 
share 
22% 26% 30% 
λ  0.013% 0.010% 0.005% 
 
Intuitively, optimal indexation increases as the correlation between true and biased 
inflation is increased (a reduction in indexation bias), and falls as it is reduced. 
Optimal indexation is reasonably robust to this correlation, but the welfare gain from 
PLT is rather sensitive. When the inflation correlation is low (i.e. 0.80), the welfare 
gain from PLT increases by roughly one-third. Intuitively, with indexation bias 
increased, indexed bonds are less able to provide protection against the relatively high 
level of inflation risk under IT. By the same token, an increase in the indexation 
correlation to 0.98 reduces the welfare gain from PLT, because indexed bonds will 
provide much better insurance against inflation risk, reducing to a large extent the cost 
of having high inflation risk under IT. In the low indexation bias case, the welfare 
gain from PLT is halved to 0.005 per cent. 
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6.3 Model variances 
 
As the welfare gain from PLT is robust to changes in the productivity innovation 
variance,37 this section focuses on sensitivity with respect to nominal volatility and 
the indexation lag length (as captured by 2vσ ).   
 
Nominal volatility 
 
In order to investigate sensitivity to nominal volatility, alternative money supply 
innovation standard deviations of 0.051 and 0.081 are considered – approximately 25 
per cent deviations from the baseline calibration of 0.066. Moreover, in order to 
ensure that indexation bias and the indexation lag are held constant as the money 
supply innovation variance is changed,38 the innovation variance to biased inflation 
and the indexation lag innovation variance are changed in the same ratio. The 
innovation variances under the high and low nominal volatility calibrations are given 
in Table 10.    
 
Table 10 – Nominal volatility sensitivity calibrations 
Money supply innovation variance )var( ,tiε  
Low                                                                      
41087.0 −×  
Baseline
41044.1 −×  
High
41020.2 −×  
Indexed inflation innovation variance )var( ,
ind
tiε  
Low 
41030.1 −×  
Baseline 
41013.2 −×  
High 
41020.3 −×  
Indexation lag innovation variance 2vσ  
Low 
5107.8 −×   
Baseline 
00015.0  
High 
000220.0  
 
 
The corresponding sensitivity results are reported in Table 11. Increasing nominal 
volatility increases optimal indexation slightly and increases welfare gain from PLT 
by one-fifth to 0.012 per cent. Intuitively, the welfare gain from PLT rises because 
nominal volatility is increased whilst real risk from holding capital is held constant, so 
that inflation volatility becomes a relatively more important factor in consumption 
risk for old generations. Conversely, a reduction in nominal volatility reduces optimal 
indexation compared to the baseline case, and the welfare gain from PLT falls to 
0.007 per cent.    
 
                                                 
37 Again, results are available from the author on request. 
38 Indexation bias results from the less than perfect correlation between true inflation and the biased 
inflation rate used for indexation, and also from the difference in their variances. 
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Table 11 – Sensitivity to nominal volatility 
                                  
Simulated value 
Nominal volatility 
Low Baseline High 
IT optimal 
indexation share 
75% 76% 79% 
PLT optimal 
indexation share 
23% 26% 28% 
λ  0.007% 0.010% 0.012% 
 
 
Indexation lag length 
 
In order to investigate sensitivity along this dimension, alternative calibrations are 
considered for the white noise innovation tv  that enters the return on indexed bonds, 
and whose variance was calibrated based on the length of the indexation lag. The 
innovation variance in the baseline calibration was set at 00015.02 =vσ  based on 
estimation results for RPI inflation over a three quarter horizon – a horizon which is 
approximately equal to the indexation lag on index-linked gilts in the UK of 8 
months. However, since many developed countries issue indexed bonds with an 
indexation lag of three months, it is instructive to consider the impact of reducing the 
indexation lag length.39 The sensitivity analysis below considers the impact of 
calibrating the model for an indexation lag of three months (i.e. 2vσ  one-third of the 
baseline value), and also the impact of a longer indexation lag of 15 months (an 
increase in 2vσ  of two-thirds on the baseline value). The calibrations and results are 
reported in Table 12. 
 
Table 12 – Sensitivity to the indexation lag 
 
Simulated value                                
 
Indexation lag length 
High 
(5 quarters) 
00027.02 =vσ  
Baseline  
(3 quarters) 
00015.02 =vσ  
Low 
(1 quarter) 
52 103.5 −×=vσ  
IT optimal  
indexation share 
72% 76% 83% 
PLT optimal  
indexation share 
17% 26% 44% 
λ  0.010% 0.010% 0.008% 
 
 
The indexation lag length has a non-trivial impact on optimal indexation. For 
instance, when calibration is based on a one-quarter indexation lag, optimal 
indexation increases under both IT and PLT, and the IT-PLT indexation differential is 
                                                 
39 The UK also issues indexed bonds with a lag of three months, but the majority of bonds outstanding 
have an eight-month indexation lag (DMO, 2010). 
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reduced to from 50 per cent to 39 per cent. Optimal indexation increases because the 
indexation lag becomes a less important source of volatility, thus making indexed 
bonds less risky relative to nominal bonds. Indexation rises more sharply under PLT 
because a reduction in the indexation lag length is a more important factor in indexed 
return volatility than under IT, since the extent of inflation risk to which indexed bond 
returns are vulnerable is markedly lower under PLT. By the same reasoning, an 
increase in the length of the indexation lag to 5 quarters reduces optimal indexation 
under both IT and PLT and increases the optimal indexation differential.  
Interestingly, the increase in the indexation lag length has no impact on the welfare 
gain from PLT (to 3 decimal places), though reducing the indexation lag length to one 
quarter (i.e. 3 months) reduces the welfare gain by one-fifth. Intuitively, a reduction in 
the indexation lag length lessens the potential gains from PLT because consumption 
risk for old generations becomes less dependent on the payoff from nominal bonds, 
and is therefore less strongly linked to the level of long-term inflation risk.  
 
6.4 Model specification 
 
This section considers sensitivity of the welfare results to the inclusion of indexed 
bonds and capital in the model. The motivation for studying robustness along these 
dimensions is that there is substantial heterogeneity across developed countries in 
terms of the extent of indexation and the importance of the public sector in retirement 
income provision (OECD, 2009). For example, in the US and UK, the shares of 
indexed bonds in the government bond portfolio are non-trivial and both the public 
and private sector pay an important role in provision of retirement income via private 
and public sector pensions. At the other end of the spectrum, Germany does not issue 
indexed government bonds, and public sector pensions, which are linked to wages and 
not prices (once in payment), account for more than 80 per cent of retirement income 
(Börsch-Supan, 2000).  
 
Table 13 reports results for three different versions of the model. Firstly, Model 1 is 
the full baseline model. Secondly, Model 2 is the full model but with indexed bonds 
excluded – i.e. an indexation share of zero, so that 0,, == dit
si
t bb  for all t. Finally, 
Model 3 excludes both indexed bonds and capital; hence 0,, === t
di
t
si
t kbb  for all t.
40 
Given that the welfare results are rather sensitive to risk aversion and the extent of 
nominal volatility, the welfare gain is also reported for the high and low values of risk 
aversion and nominal volatility discussed, respectively, in sections 6.2 and 6.3.  
 
                                                 
40 Note that since capital is excluded from the model, Model 3 is a pure endowment economy. The 
endowment income of the young is normalised to one in this model, since this means that asset 
holdings can be interpreted as proportions of GDP. Accordingly, the government spending target was 
halved to 0.20, so that it remained at one-fifth of GDP.  
 32
Table 13 – Sensitivity to model specification 
 
Model 
(1) 
Full model 
(2) 
Nominal bonds 
+ capital 
(3) 
Nominal bonds 
 
Consumption equivalent 
welfare gain  λ  
 
 
Risk aversion sensitivity 
(low, high) 
 
Nominal volatility 
sensitivity 
(low, high) 
 
Baseline reduction in 
)var( ,Otc  
 
 
0.010% 
 
 
 
0.006%,0.014% 
 
 
 
 
0.007%,0.012% 
 
 
 
13.1% 
 
 
 
0.026% 
 
 
 
0.012%, 0.044% 
 
 
 
 
0.015%, 0.039% 
 
 
 
39.4% 
 
 
0.103% 
 
 
 
0.052%, 0.173% 
 
 
 
 
0.062%, 0.154% 
 
 
 
96.4% 
 
The welfare gain from PLT is positive in all three models, but its magnitude varies 
substantially across the different specifications. For instance, the welfare gain is 
equivalent to 0.026 per cent of aggregate consumption in Model 2 (when indexed 
bonds are removed) – more than double the original estimate. The reasoning is that 
indexed bonds provide excellent insurance against the high level of inflation risk 
under IT, so that their absence is somewhat costly under an IT regime. When capital 
is also absent in Model 3, the welfare gain from PLT increases even further to 0.103 
per cent of aggregate consumption, and close to one-tenth of one per cent of GDP. 
This marked increase arises because removing capital increases the share of inflation-
vulnerable assets in consumers’ savings portfolios, and hence eliminates a substantial 
source of consumption risk (viz. productivity) that is unaffected by monetary policy.  
 
Both of these effects work to increase the proportional impact of PLT on consumption 
risk through the inflation risk channel, thus increasing the welfare gain from PLT. 
This link is made strikingly clear by the last row of Table 13: consumption volatility 
across old generations is reduced by less than 15 per cent in the full model (i.e. Model 
1), compared to more than a 95 per cent reduction in Model 3! Given that Model 3 
posits the extreme case in which consumers hold only nominal assets, the results in 
this case can be considered an upper bound estimate of the long-term welfare gain 
from PLT.      
 
The Model 2 and Model 3 results are highly sensitive to both risk aversion and the 
extent of nominal volatility. In Model 2, reducing the risk aversion coefficient to 3/2 
lowers the welfare gain from PLT to 0.012 per cent, whilst an increase up to 5 
increases the welfare gain to 0.044 per cent – an increase of almost seven-tenths on 
the baseline estimate. Sensitivity is also strong with respect to nominal volatility, with 
a slightly narrower range from 0.015 per cent (low volatility) to 0.039 per cent (high 
 33
volatility). The variability of results is increased even further in Model 3. For 
example, when risk aversion is low (a coefficient of 3/2), the welfare gain is roughly 
halved to 0.052 per cent, whilst when risk aversion is high (a coefficient of 5) the 
welfare gain is equal to 0.173 per cent – more than 15 times the baseline estimate in 
Model 1 and equivalent to a permanent increase in GDP of more than one-eighth. As 
in Model 2, sensitivity with respect to nominal volatility is almost as strong. Overall, 
the sensitivity results in Table 13 suggest that the welfare gain from PLT will lie 
between 0.005 and 0.173 per cent of aggregate consumption.  
 
Several important policy implications follow from the model specification sensitivity 
analysis reported in Table 13. Firstly, the welfare gain from PLT is likely to vary 
substantially across countries, since the ‘best model’ for any country will depend 
upon which assets are the most important in the provision of retirement income. For 
example, in the case of the UK and US, the full model with capital and indexed and 
nominal bonds (i.e. Model 1) is likely to be most applicable, suggesting a relatively 
small potential welfare gain from switching to PLT. On the other hand, public sector 
pensions account for a substantial fraction of retirement income in Germany and 
indexed government bonds are not issued. Therefore, Model 3 may be most relevant 
in this case, suggesting a somewhat higher potential welfare gain from PLT. 
Secondly, the welfare gain from PLT varies substantially with nominal volatility and 
risk aversion, and is hence likely to vary across countries, being higher in countries in 
which IT is less successful and society is more risk-averse.  Finally, although the 
long-term welfare gain from PLT is estimated to be small in the baseline model, the 
presence of substantial sensitivity on the upside implies that this gain cannot, in 
general, be safely ignored by a cost-benefit analysis of PLT.         
 
7. Conclusions and policy implications 
 
An important area neglected by recent research comparing inflation targeting and 
price-level targeting is the impact of price-level targeting on social welfare via the 
long-term inflation risk channel. In this paper, a dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium (DSGE) model was presented in which long-term inflation risk has a 
direct impact on social welfare, and the model was subsequently used to evaluate the 
welfare impact of price-level targeting. The literature on price-level targeting predicts 
that its long-term welfare impact will be positive (e.g. Duguay, 1994; Minford, 2004; 
Bank of Canada, 2009), but has stopped short of modelling this impact explicitly in a 
DSGE framework. The main goal of the current paper was to quantify – in a way that 
is meaningful for policy – the long-term welfare impact of price-level targeting.  
 
In order to focus on the long-term, the model presented consists of overlapping 
generations of consumers that live for two periods of 30 years each. In effect, the 
model is one of optimal pension provision: young consumers save for old age by 
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holding money and capital, plus indexed and nominal government bonds. Since both 
indexed and nominal bonds are imperfect stores of purchasing power, the model 
captures a potentially important channel from long-term inflation risk to social 
welfare. The two key features of the model are that (i) the extent of indexation of 
government bonds depends on monetary policy regime and is computed as the 
solution to an optimal commitment Ramsey problem, and (ii) monetary policy is 
modelled via money supply rules that capture the long-term outcomes of inflation 
targeting and price-level targeting – viz. ‘base-level drift’ in the price level versus 
trend-stationarity. 
 
The main result from the model is that price-level targeting leads to small gain in 
welfare compared to inflation targeting – a permanent increase in aggregate 
consumption of 0.01 per cent in the baseline case. The reasoning behind this welfare 
gain runs as follows. Long-term inflation uncertainty is substantial under inflation 
targeting because of base-level drift: even if the central bank misses its inflation target 
by only a small percentage in each year, these misses can accumulate and become 
large after 30 years. Consequently, real bonds returns are relatively volatile in an 
inflation targeting regime, increasing consumption volatility somewhat for old 
generations. Under price-level targeting, by contrast, past deviations from the 
inflation target do not accumulate so that long-term inflation volatility is reduced by 
an order of magnitude. Bonds returns are therefore stabilised, and consumption risk is 
reduced for old generations by around 15 per cent. Though this reduction in 
consumption risk is responsible for the increase in welfare under price-level targeting, 
the welfare gain itself is much smaller, in percentage terms, than the reduction in risk, 
because volatility has only a second-order impact on social welfare. Although optimal 
indexation is substantially lower under price-level targeting (26 per cent versus 76 per 
cent), the endogenieity of indexation is not necessary for welfare to increase under 
price-level targeting. Indeed, holding indexation fixed at the optimal level under 
inflation targeting produces a welfare gain, albeit a lower one by one-fifth. 
 
The welfare results obtained are highly sensitive along a number of important 
dimensions. Most notably, both indexed bonds and capital play a crucial role in the 
model. If consumers do not have access to indexed government bonds (or if the share 
of such bonds is close to zero), the welfare gain from price-level targeting is more 
than doubled, because consumers are unable to insure themselves against the high 
level of inflation risk under inflation targeting by holding indexed bonds. If, in 
addition, capital is removed from the model, the welfare gain from price-level 
targeting is ten times the baseline estimate. The reasoning is that with consumers’ 
savings entirely in nominal assets, consumption risk remains substantial under 
inflation targeting but is largely eliminated by price-level targeting.  
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There is also considerable sensitivity to key calibrated quantities in the model. In 
particular, both risk aversion and the extent of nominal volatility play an important 
role. For instance, increasing risk aversion raises the welfare gain from price-level 
targeting markedly because it makes a reduction in consumption volatility (a second-
order impact) relatively more important for social welfare. Increasing the level of 
nominal volatility also raises the welfare gain somewhat, though there is less 
sensitivity than with respect to risk aversion. The intuition for this result is simply that 
the benefit from targeting the price level is proportional to the extent of nominal 
volatility; if such volatility is low then, intuitively, there is little price-level targeting 
can do to improve upon the situation. On the other hand, if nominal volatility is 
substantial, then there is scope for price-level targeting to reduce a substantial 
proportion of consumption risk faced by old generations. Overall, sensitivity analysis 
suggests that the welfare gain from price-level targeting will range from 0.005 to 
0.173 per cent of aggregate consumption. Hence, the potential welfare gain from 
price-level targeting through the inflation risk channel is relatively small, but not 
sufficiently so that it can safely be ignored in a cost-benefit analysis.   
 
A number of notable policy implications arise from these results. Firstly, although the 
baseline estimated welfare gain from price-level targeting is small, this gain is driven 
by a reduction in consumption volatility for old generations of around 15 per cent. 
Hence old generations (i.e. pensioners) stand to gain from a non-trivial reduction in 
consumption risk under a price-level targeting regime. Secondly, the potential welfare 
gain from price-level targeting is rather sensitive, in particular on the upside. The 
potential gains from targeting the price level are higher for countries with more 
nominal volatility and greater risk-aversion, and also for countries in which 
indexation is not widespread (or is non-existent) and the government is the primary 
provider of retirement income. Based on these results, countries like Germany – 
where the large majority of retirement income comes from state pensions that are not 
indexed to prices, and indexed bonds are not issued – would have more to gain from 
targeting the price level. Finally, this paper has demonstrated that an OLG model of 
life-cycle saving can be fruitfully used to study optimal monetary policy over a long-
term horizon. Indeed, a key advantage of the model over the workhorse New 
Keynesian model is that the impact of long-term inflation risk on social welfare can 
be modelled explicitly using consumer utility.       
 
Future research should look to test the robustness of the conclusions reached in this 
paper in more comprehensive models of the kind used by central banks for 
quantitative policy analysis. For example, two recent contributions that utilise models 
that are calibrated in detail for individual economies are the papers by Dopeke and 
Schneider (2006) and Meh, Rios-Rull and Terajima (2010), which study the 
redistributive effects of inflation through revaluation effects on nominal claims. The 
paper by Meh, Rios-Rull and Terajima (2010) is particularly notable, because it 
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compares redistribution under inflation and price-level targeting within a model of the 
Canadian economy, and computes changes in welfare arising from these redistribution 
effects. Lastly, it should be noted that a key assumption in the current paper is that the 
price level is returned to its target path within one year under a price-level targeting 
regime. However, returning the price level to trend this quickly could lead to 
excessive output volatility, so that a horizon somewhat longer than one year may be 
optimal (see Smets, 2003). Importantly, a longer horizon for returning the price level 
to target would eliminate some of the reduction in long-term inflation risk under 
price-level targeting, and would hence reduce its positive impact on social welfare. 
The importance of the target horizon is an interesting issue that is left for future 
research. 
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Appendix A – Proof that the CIA constraint binds with strict equality when 
1>tR  
 
In this appendix it is shown that the CIA constraint is strictly binding if the gross 
money return on a nominal bond exceeds the gross return on money of one. The 
Lagrangian from the main text can be used to derive this result, with allowance made 
for the possibility that the CIA constraint may not hold with strict equality. 
Consequently, the Lagrangian will additionally give rise to Kuhn-Tucker conditions 
relating to the Lagrange multiplier on the CIA constraint.  
 
Proposition: The CIA constraint binds with strict equality when 1>tR  
 
Proof.  
From the main text the first-order conditions for indexed bonds, nominal bonds and 
money holdings are as follows: 
                                                  ( ) titOttYt rcEc θµδδ += +−+− 1,1,                         (A1) 
   ( ) tntOttYt rcEc θµδδ += +−+− 1,1,              (A2) 
            ( ) tmtOttYt rcEc µθδδ )1(1,1, ++= +−+−              (A3) 
 
where tµ  is the Lagrange multiplier on the CIA constraint.  
 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions associated with tµ  are summarised in the following 
equation: 
          { }0)(      and      0 , =−≥ Ytttt cm θµµ                             (A4) 
   
where the second equation, the complementary slackness condition, implies that the 
CIA constraint will be strictly binding if 0>tµ  for all t.  
 
Using Equations (A2) and (A3), the Lagrange multiplier tµ  will strictly positive iff  
 
           ( ) ( )mtOttntOtt rcErcE 1,11,1 +−++−+ > δδ   t∀                  (A5) 
 
Substitution of the real return on nominal bonds into Equation (A5) gives 
 
        ( ) ( )mtOttmtOttt rcErcER 1,11,1 +−++−+ >× δδ   t∀            (A6) 
 
Dividing Inequality (A6) by ( )mtOtt rcE 1,1 +−+δ  yields the following necessary condition for 
the nominal interest rate: 
     1>tR ,  t∀              (A7)
  
Finally, notice that ( ) ( )itOttntOtt rcErcE 1,11,1 +−++−+ = δδ , such that Inequality (A7) ensures that 
holding indexed bonds is also strictly preferred to holding money, i.e. 
 
                             ( ) ( )mtOttitOtt rcErcE 1,11,1 +−++−+ > δδ ,     t∀     iff  1>tR              Q.E.D.  (A8) 
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Appendix B: The link between lifetime utility and long-term inflation risk 
 
A second-order expansion of the lifetime utility of generation t can be written in the 
following form: 
 
            )(var
)(2
1~
,11
,1
Ott
Ott
t ccE
u ++
+ 







−≈ δ
δ
                        (B1) 
 
where ),(~ ,1, OttYtttt cEcuuu +−≡  is the deviation of lifetime utility from its value when 
consumption in youth and old age are at their time-t expected values.  
 
In order to evaluate the term )(var ,1 Ott c + , note that log-linearising the budget constraint 
faced in old age around the deterministic steady-state gives the following expression: 
 
   [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]dtmtmdntntnndititiittOtO mrmrbrbrbrbrkAAkcc ˆˆˆˆˆˆˆˆˆ 1,1,11,1 +++++++= +++++ αα  (B2) 
 
where ‘hats’ indicate percentage deviations from the deterministic steady-state; 
steady-state values are defined by the absence of time subscripts; and ttt eAA +=+ ˆˆ 1 ρ . 
 
The log-linearised real returns on money balances, indexed bonds and nominal bonds 
are as follows:                                                       
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where ssπ  is the steady-state rate of inflation. 
 
The right hand side of Equation (B2) can be written in terms of actual inflation and 
biased inflation using equations (B3) to (B5). Carrying out these steps and noting that 
)ˆ1( ,1,1 OtOOt ccc ++ += , consumption in old age can be expressed as follows: 
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Expected consumption in old age is given by  
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Thus, the conditional variance of consumption in old age is given by  
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where )(var 1+tt π  is the conditional variance of actual inflation, )(var 1
ind
tt +π  is the 
conditional variance of biased inflation, and the fact that 
22
1
2
1 )(var)ˆ(var etttt AAAA σ
−
+
−
+ ==  has been used. 
 
Therefore, by Equation (B1), the utility loss of generation t can be written as follows: 
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where 0)()1()( )1(,1
22 >+++≡ +−+
− δπδχ Ott
ssmnnii
t cEmrbrbr , and OttcE ,1+  is given 
by Equation (B7).  
 
Coefficients are defined as follows: 
22 )/()( mrbrbrbr mnniiii ++≡ϕ                (B10) 
iimnnii brmrbrbr /)( ++≡ϕκ                (B11) 
2)1( ssπϕη +≡                   (B12) 
απϑ 222 )1()( kmrbrbr ssmnnii +++≡ −                (B13) 
 
Note that in the special case when indexed bonds and capital are excluded from the 
model (i.e. 0== kb i ), the loss in lifetime utility is given by )(var
2
1~
1+−≈ ttttu πχ  
since 0==== ϑηκϕ .  
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Appendix C – Derivations of the IT and PLT money supply rules from a yearly 
horizon 
 
Inflation targeting 
 
Consider the following yearly IT money supply rule that aims at a constant inflation 
target and is subject to exogenous monetary innovations in each year i:   
 
         YiYii
ITs
i
ITs
i ccMM ,1,
,
1
, lnlnlnln −− −+++= επ                           (C1) 
 
where π  is the yearly inflation target and iε  is an IID-normal money supply 
innovation with mean zero and variance 2σ .  
 
To derive a 30-year money supply rule from this yearly specification, substitute 
repeatedly for the lagged money supply term on the right-hand side of Equation (C1) 
until the following 30-year money supply rule is reached: 
 
       YiYi
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i ccMM ,30,
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0
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, lnln30lnln −
=
−− −++×+= ∑επ            (C2) 
 
This equation states that the 30-year growth rate of the nominal money supply has 
three components: a 30-year inflation target π×30 ; the sum-total of 30 separate 
yearly money supply innovations; and the 30-year rate of growth of consumption by 
the young.  
 
Given that each period t lasts 30 years, Equation (C2) implies that the money supply 
rule in any period t can be represented in the following form:  
 
                                ∑
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30
1
,1,,
,
1
, lnln  30lnln
i
YtYtti
ITs
t
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t ccMM επ             (C3) 
 
where, for ease of exposition, the Gaussian white noise money supply innovations 
have been re-indexed from years 1 to 30, and the time subscript indicates that all 30 
innovations belong to period t. 
 
Price-level targeting 
 
Consider the following yearly PLT money supply rule that aims at a target yearly (log) 
price level of ipPi ×+= π0
*ln  in each year i: 
 
        YiYiii
PLTs
i
PLTs
i ccMM ,1,1
,
1
, lnlnlnln −−− −+−++= εεπ              (C4) 
 
where π  is the constant yearly inflation target that is consistent with the target price 
path, and iε  is an IID-Normal innovation with mean zero and variance 
2σ  (exactly as 
in the IT case). 
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To derive the implied money supply rule over a 30-year horizon, substitute for the 
lagged money supply term on the right hand side of Equation (C4) until the following 
expression is reached:  
       
     YiYiii
PLTs
i
PLTs
i ccMM ,30,30
,
30
, lnln30lnln −−− −+−+×+= εεπ       (C5) 
 
Given that each period t lasts 30 years, Equation (C5) implies a period t money supply 
rule of the form  
                                YtYttt
ITs
t
ITs
t ccMM ,1,1,30,30
,
1
, lnln 30ln −−− −+−+×=− εεπ        (C6) 
 
where again the money supply innovations have been indexed to reflect the year in 
which they occur, and the t subscript indicates the period to which innovations 
belong. 
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Appendix D: Deterministic steady-state and market-clearing conditions  
 
Deterministic steady state41 
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in rrAk ==−1αα    (from the Euler equations for capital and bonds)  (D17) 
 
meanAA =                  (D18) 
                                                 
41 ssπ denotes the steady-state rate of inflation.  
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Market-clearing conditions 
 
A monetary equilibrium in the OLG economy is a set of allocations 
{ }T
t
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n
ttt
s
t
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t
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t
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tOtYt rRrgmmkbbbbcc 1
,,,,
,, ,,,,,,,,,,,,,, =τπ  with the following 
properties for all t: 
 
(1) Allocations { }T
t
d
tt
dn
t
di
tOtYt mkbbcc 1
,,
,1,  , , , , , =+  solve the maximisation problem of a 
young consumer born at time t; 
 
(2) The goods, money and bond markets clear:  
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(3) The government’s budget constraint and long run government spending target are 
satisfied: 
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*)( ggE t =                  (D24) 
 48
Appendix E: Model listing 
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u             Lifetime utility of generation t                        (E1) 
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ttmeant eAAA ++−= −1lnln)1(ln ρρ   Productivity               (E4) 
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( )( )mtntOttYt rrcEc 11,1, )1( ++−+− −+= θθδδ        Euler equation for nominal bonds            (E9) 
 
( )( )mtitOttYt rrcEc 11,1, )1( ++−+− −+= θθδδ  Euler equation for indexed bonds          (E10) 
 
( )( )mtttOttYt rkAcEc 111,1, )1( +−+−+− −+= θαθ αδδ      Euler equation for capital          (E11) 
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 49
( )δδ −+− = 1, ttYt cEc                                  Total bond supply rule                                   (E19) 
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,, +=          Total bond supply definition           (E20) 
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t
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,, −==                      Market-clearing in nominal bonds               (E22) 
 
s
t
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t
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,,                       Market-clearing in indexed bonds                 (E23) 
 
αϖ 1,, −+=+++ ttttOtYt kAgkcc       Market-clearing in goods           (E24) 
 
 
 
 
 
